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Chris Nothstine on the East End Raid

Chris Nothstine firefighter

Chris Nothstine was one of the “trackers”, from 4th AAB (Amphibious Assault Battalion), that were attached to India Co.  Now a wildland firefighter in Mississippi, back in 2005 he was the Crew Chief on one of the AAVs at Gannon.  Chris has graciously shared his combat journal with me, which provides great details and insights.

Chris Nothstine AAV

One of many first-hand stories in his journal describes the so-called East End Raid during the early morning hours of 2 April 2005.  India’s objective for the raid was to capture or kill key members of an insurgent cell.  The objectives were in the southeast corner of Husaybah, in a known bad-guy area.  There were four AAVs (also called “tracs” or “tracks”) on the mission, with Chris manning the gun turret in track number 4.

It was a major raid, conducted with a reinforced platoon (2nd Plt) and attachments.  About 100 Marines were part of the raid force.  The concept was to move rapidly to the objectives at O-dark-thirty, thus avoiding insurgent gunmen and hitting the targets with little or no opposition.  But that’s not quite how things turned out, as Chris describes below.

Here’s a map for orientation.  The lighter blue line shows part of the harrowing detour that tracks 3 and 4 took that night, as Chris remembers it anyway.  East End Raid mapThis is a transcription of several of Chris’ handwritten journal pages:

NIGHT RAID 4/1/05

This morning at the stroke of 0200 we rolled into the city.  At 2200 on 4/1/05 we got on our tracks. Me, Massa, and Walker prayed over intercom.  We staged, went over our route and objectives again, then rolled. We went to Canal St, then south on Colt 45 where a D-9 had cleared the obstacles.  Friendlies were on the corner of Market and Colt 45. Once we got on Market (I was the last track) we took fire 2 blocks up.

We took constant fire all the way down Market.  The fire was from the rooftops (south to north fire) a block off of Market.  They were firing AK-47s loaded with straight tracers. We all missed our turn and the first track turned right at the “triangle of death”.  Then we were on East End St. We took RPK and AK fire all the way down East End. There were 4-5 grunts in the back. Rivera had a SAW and was putting out heavy suppressing fire.

We missed our objective (all the tracks).  Turned around and track 1 and 2 set in and took a little fire.  A man popped out within 25 meters of Track 2’s rear with an RPG aimed in on them.  3/2’s snipers in the overwatch position took him out. Thank God.

3 and 4 tracks went back north on East End and hit the soccer field, then turned south on East End and went west somewhere (an RPG impacted at my track’s rear).  Of course we followed track 3 because we can’t roll alone. We made some wrong turns and I advised them we need to head south back to Train Rd and then look for our objectives.  

Finally we took a road to the south.  Two story buildings were on both sides.  We took accurate AK fire (all tracers). I opened up with the .50 cal to suppress as Rivera did the same.  Then we took a left on a dead end street. Massa (my driver) reported an RPG ten meters in front. Myself and Rivera were still suppressing as we turned around at the dead end.  We ran over two fences, a garden and a car. On the way back no one fired, thanks to the .50 cal and the grunts laying down suppressing fire.  

I again advised 03 to take two lefts which would put us back on train.  Once we were on Train, 03 finally found their street, which let me set in on my objective.  The grunts got out and cleared the house. Set off two thermite grenades on the vehicles. No fire from my set position.  I advised SSgt Greer we couldn’t go with our original egress plan, which had us going back through some of the same streets.  I told them we took too much fire from that part of the city. The XO OK’d it. Thank God.

We took on EPWs.  In our objective we had 17 kids 4-6 years old, three females and one male.  Most likely we found the “Night Wolves” daycare. That was the insurgent group we were targeting on this raid.  We crossed to Train Rd, then took sporadic small arms until we left. The Engineers blew [up] a shed with the RPG warhead from the dead guy and a rocket.

Our grunts were happy and pumped.  The enjoyed the ride and appreciated the suppressing fire.  They said we did everything perfect. When about 500 meters away, we took accurate small arms fire again, and Lopez and a SAW gunner (not Rivera) opened up and suppressed as we egressed.  The [shed] blew and we were out.

0520 we were back at Gannon.  Four target houses. One squad on a track plus security.  18 EPWs and 15 confirmed kills. 0 WIA, 0 KIA. It was successful.  One house had IED material, batteries voltage meters, and some more stuff.  AK recovered from a dead guy. RPG launch tube recovered. Another house was searched and they found and AK-47 and a pistol (US M-9).  He was an ING Major. We took his weapons and him though. He was cooperative, but if he wasn’t playing [with] or training insurgents, he would have been killed in that part of town.  

My crew did great, my vehicle had no issues and all I have to thank is the good Lord up above.  It was like Star Wars. Massa ran over 3 walls and two cars. He also navigated well. I was amazed when they first opened up on us on Market.  Our grunts were awesome and were constantly laying down fire. Many bullet holes in the track, and the 3rd shock on the STBD side bolt was sheared off.

We’re all back, and we killed at least 15 and took 18 military aged males.  We did awesome. Thank God. When the first rounds went off over my head and tracers were everywhere, I thought of Lisa, and then that was it.  The rest of the time we were under constant fire and in the zone. Massa and Walker both were baptized by fire on this this raid and did really well.

Massa did keep coming over the intercom and was saying “We are gonna die. We are gonna die.  What the fuck? RPG! Where the fuck are we going?” I told him to follow track 3 until they found their house so we could set in.  WE ALL DID AWESOME.

 

Need Help With Gannon Locations

Here’s what I know about the layout and locations on Camp Gannon in 2005.  This is a Google Earth image from Dec 2004, annotated with the guardposts (P1-P8) and a few other locations.  I’m looking for where the chowhall, the latrines, and the burn pit were.  Also, I don’t have a location for P4 (was there one?)  If anyone can pinpoint these or other buildings, it would be a big help.  BTW, Camp Gannon was dismantled long ago, so there are no OPSEC considerations regarding this info.  Contact me here.

Here’s an updated map, based on a hand-drawn sketch by Chris Nothstine, one of the ‘trackers’ with 4th AAB.  Also had input from Dali Markovic.  I’ve made the annotations smaller, in order to place them more accurately.  You’ll have to zoom in close to read them.
Gannon layout6

Also, here’s Chris’ sketch map (posted with permission):

Notebook map-Chris Nothstine

Here’s my other version, with the larger annotations:

 

Area Familiarization with Gunny Hogancamp

area famThe first time I saw this short, grainy video clip (linked below), I thought it was hilarious, but didn’t know who it was or what he was talking about.  It just showed a highly animated Marine, briefing someone about Husaybah and the surrounding area.  Since then, I’ve slowly unraveled the rest of the story.

It shows Gunny Brian Hogancamp, probably in early March 2005, giving an ‘area familiarization brief’ to other members of 3/2.  He had been part of the ADVON (advance team) out to Gannon in late February, and had already been doing left-seat/right-seat missions with 1/7’s Baker Co, and had been blown up once.  This helps explains his emphatic presentation.

In the clip, he’s giving a very dynamic and succinct overview of the danger areas in and around Husaybah, punctuated with some Marine-standard “colorful” phrases.  ***language warning***.  I’m not entirely sure if this was an actual, briefing or it was delivered for dramatic effect (maybe someone can tell me that).  Either way, the Gunny’s briefing vividly shows the threat environment that India Co. arrived into, and would operate in.  Update: I’ve now heard from one of the officers who was in the room, and witnessed this first-hand. So it must have been an actual briefing.

Brian Hogancamp, who eventually retired as a Sgt Maj, was the Company Gunny and one of the key leaders for India Company.  He ran the effort to build up and fortify Battle Position Harman, aka ‘Trash OP’.  A while back, I interviewed him several times, and his information allowed me to write the chapter about Trash OP, which you can download from the homepage.

Anyway, enjoy the clip.  I love the last little touch, where he says, “other than that, from about 1100 to noon, this area [pointing to Gannon itself] is relatively safe.”
And again, ***language warning***

 

Need stories from Camp Gannon

050503-M-4224F-001

I’m working on chapters about India Company and the fight out at Camp Gannon, and events in and around Husaybah in 2005.  While I’ve spoken to several marines who were there, I could really use more information and first-hand stories about those days (Feb-Sep 2005).  If you were there, I’d like to hear from you.  I know there were guys from WarPig and other elements there also.

I’ve already written chapters covering the complex attack of April 11th, and another about Trash OP.  (You can link to those on the homepage).  But more details and insights are always welcome.

Now I’ll be working on filling out the chronology, describing conditions at Gannon, and covering what happened towards the end of the deployment as the AQI foreign fighters pushed into Husaybah to force out the local tribal forces that had started a loose cooperation with the Marines.

To reach me, use the contact link here, or text me thru my Facebook page.  Also, if you want to share some stories with me, please read through my ‘rules of engagement’.

–Ajax

Operation Outlaw, 8 Jul 05

[Correction: Op was on 8 Jul, not 7 Jul]

CH-53 landing

On 8 July 2005, the Battalion mounted a Cordon & Search operation on the north bank of the Euphrates, a few miles to the east of New Ubaydi.  I believe this was called “Operation Outlaw”, and was mostly conducted by WarPig3 (Weapons Co, 3rd Platoon).  Recently, I interviewed Scott “Special” Edwards, who was the senior Forward Air Controller (FAC) with 3/2.  I also spoke with Chuck Yannizzi, the EOD Team Lead attached to 3/2.  They were both on the ground that day, and had a close call as they were picked up by CH-53s on a hot LZ.

Below is Scott Edwards’ account, as related to me, and used with his permission.  I was going to use this in the ‘Close Air’ chapter, but am now thinking about expanding it and using it in another chapter.

So, if anyone has more knowledge of this operation, or can guide me to more info about it, I’d really like to hear that.  Here’s what I’ve written so far…


Operation Outlaw

Later that summer, Capt Edwards himself was involved in a dicey situation when air support may have saved the day, as well as his own hide.  After discovering the pontoon bridge cache on June 4th, Weapons Company launched another cordon and search to the same area. This was Operation Outlaw, on July 8th, with WarPig 3 and attachments inserted via CH-53 helicopters in the predawn hours.  Edwards went along to coordinate air support.

 

outlaw5 yazzinni
Searching through the palm groves.  (Chuck Yannizzi photo) 

The search lasted through the day, locating heavy weapons and a dump truck converted into an improvised rocket launcher.  From a rooftop south of the village, Edwards controlled several helo strikes on targets across the river near New Ubaydi. As the mission wound down, the marines prepared for extract.  But when the big CH-53s approached, small arms fire broke out. Insurgents had filtered through the fields, and Edwards could hear the rattle of a firefight breaking out to the north.

 

He and four others left the farmhouse where they’d been, heading for the LZ.  They’d moved only a hundred meters when AK rounds started snapping by. Enemy fighters had slipped into the house they’d just left, and were firing at them as the CH-53s landed.  

Edwards hurriedly worked the radio to bring in a Huey-Cobra team for immediate support.  Gunny Chuck Yannizzi, the EOD Team Lead, was crouched next to Edwards and watched as a Cobra banked in aggressively.  “Hey, he’s aiming right at us!”, Yannizzi called out. But at the last second the pilot kicked rudder and let loose on the house. “When I saw the Hellfire impact that house, I figured it was time to go,” Edwards recalls.  “We sprinted to the bird, and as we took off, the 53s took some small arms fire.”

OpOutlaw map

(Map shows general locations based on interviews, not precise coordinates.  Red arrows show estimated paths of insurgents as they pushed south late in the operation.)

Below, photos from the operation, showing some of the insurgent weapons and equipment found as WarPig swept through the fields and orchards:

 

 

M3361S-3034
Fuel truck found and destroyed. (Chuck Yannizzi photo)
M3361S-3034
Flatbed truck found with weapons and improvised rocket launcher in bed. (Chuck Yannizzi photo)
M3361S-3034
Weapons in truck bed, including the barrel of a 14.5mm AA gun–in foreground. (Chuck Yannizzi photo)

 

outlaw1 yazzinni
Wheeled carriage for a ZPU-1 single-barrel, Soviet-designed 14.5mm AA gun found near the riverbank. For comparison, see here. (Chuck Yannizzi photo) 

Close Air references

References and sources for the ‘Close Air’ chapter:

2nd MAW:

https://www.2ndmaw.marines.mil/News/Article-View/Article/522569/2nd-maw-fwd-commander-selected-for-brigadier-general/
2nd MAW Forward Commander, ‘Boomer’

HMLA 269 “Gunrunners”

https://www.mag29.marines.mil/MAG-29-Units/HMLA-269/About/
During 2005 the Gunrunners flew more than 5951 hours and 3994 sorties

http://www.gonavy.jp/navy/sqn/MC269.html
HMLA 269 Deployment: Jan 05 – July 05, Al-Asad Iraq

https://www.2ndmaw.marines.mil/News/Article-View/Article/522537/coyotes-sniff-out-insurgents-throughout-iraq/
More than 2,000 flight hours and 1,300 sorties

HMLA 269 Detachment OIC was Maj Rick Ray
https://www.2ndmaw.marines.mil/News/Article-View/Article/522543/gunrunners-train-aircrews-in-the-midst-of-battle/

HMLA 775 “Coyotes”:

http://www.gonavy.jp/navy/sqn/MC775.html
HMLA 775 Deployment: Mar 05 – Oct 05, Al-Asad Iraq

https://www.pendleton.marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/536385/hmla-775-returns-from-iraq/
HMLA-775 returns from Iraq.  Maj. Mark Voelker, Maj. Rob Russell, Valerie Belue

 

 

 

 

CAS Terms:

Definition of Terminal Attack Control
https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Annex_3-03/3-03-D18-LAND-Terminal-ATK-CNTRL.pdf

JP 3-09.3, 3 Sep 2003
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_09_3%2895%29.pdf

Article, ‘What CAS is and isn’t’ (3 parts)
https://fightersweep.com/3855/what-close-air-support-is-and-isnt-part-one/
https://fightersweep.com/3889/what-close-air-support-is-and-isnt-part-two/
https://fightersweep.com/4185/what-close-air-support-isand-isnt-part-three/

 

Assault on Retrans

guys by bunkersThis post provides further details about an insurgent attack on 19 Apr 05 against Battle Position Khe Sahn, aka “Retrans”.  One of my first blog posts was about Retrans, and quoted John Parina who gave me a little bit of info.  Later on, I gathered more details and included the story in the Retrans chapter.  (download it here) 

Now, thanks to a recent chat with Vinny Brothman, I’ve filled in some more of the story.  Brothman led a Fire Direction Center (FDC) in the 81mm mortar platoon of Weapons Co, and often pulled duty out at Retrans directing the mortar crews.  Here’s his first-hand account of the action that day.

I was in the main bunker playing Monopoly… We heard the 50 cal open up.  The chain of command out there went Corporal Marshall and then myself… He and I sprinted to the 50 cal. bunker to see what was going on.

We get up there and get reports of muzzle flashes coming from the Papa 6 bridge, which was about a click from Retrans… We see the flashes and decided I would request permission to fire mortars…  Marshall ran to the Mk19 bunker.  The idea was to have the 50 firing against the right side of the bridge and the Mk19 firing on the left and trap them on the bridge.  Running back to the main bunker I could hear small arms and the crack of a high powered rifle…likely a sniper.  Then I got on the radio and called into battalion… to report what’s happening.  The S3, Major Day, breaks the transmission:  

Break break, Khe Sahn, this is Betio 3.  Who am I speaking with?

Betio 3, this is Echo 3 Bravo

Roger, Brothman?

That’s affirmative

Roger. You have no friendlies or air in your vicinity. Engage any target you see fit.

Roger, Khe Sahn out.

At that point I run to the 50 cal bunker and start a fire mission.  We fired an immediate suppression on the bridge.  We were also seeing muzzle flashes coming from a multistory building right of the bridge… I climbed onto the bunker to call a fire mission for myself.  I estimated the range and shot an azimuth, or direction, from my position.  I worked a converged, sheathed mission onto the building, set the fuse to delayed impact and dropped 10 rounds on the building.
Mark Thiry w 240G
LCpl Mark Thiry, on 19 Apr 05, returning fire with the M240G machine-gun, next to the .50 cal bunker at Retrans.  (Mark Thiry photo)

The whole time the 50 and the Mk19 were going and had the enemy locked on the bridge.  I  believe Marshall had our guys pull the 240G out of the bunker and set it up on top and fired away at the bridge too. After that fire mission I focused back on the bridge, where I worked up the data on a traverse mission.  I split the two guns further to have all three guns up, gave them their data and had them dropping rounds across the entire bridge.

 

There was no more firing from the building or the bridge.  All we saw were vehicles stopping on the bridge, assuming they were picking up wounded and they left.


After that I called into Betio and reported that contact was over and they notified us that the Battalion Commander and Sgt Major were on their way.  Marshall and I debriefed them and that was it. 
When I got back to Camp AQ, our Platoon Sgt, Gunny Boldin, called me a psycho for being on top of that bunker calling my own fire missions.  

–Vinny Brothman, chat with author


And here’s an excerpt from the Retrans chapter, with more of the story:

In actuality, there was always a chance that insurgents might mount a determined attack against Retrans.  One particular incident highlighted that threat.  On April 19th, multiple insurgents used the cover of a daytime sandstorm to engage the little hilltop fort with more than hit-and-hide harassment fire.

Just after noon, apparently thinking the blowing sand would keep the Marines from responding effectively, some 15-20 men started firing machine guns and rockets at Retrans from down by the P6 highway bridge and a nearby building.

We were playing spades in the CP when we started taking small arms fire… The insurgents tried to make their move when we couldn’t see. But unfortunately (for them) we could see their muzzle flashes. We all ran to our respective bunkers and started firing back… The .50 and Mk19 were in the front where we were taking fire. We also dismounted the 240 from its bunker, and ran it up to the .50 cal bunker and [used it] to return fire. I was on the Mk19, and took the traverse and elevation off the gun, so I could track targets faster. We returned a lot of rounds before it quieted down, cleared up and was all over. –John Parina

In spite of the storm, the Marines had returned heavy fire, including 400 .50 calibre rounds and some thirty 40mm grenades, which squelched any plans the enemy may have had. But coming a few days after the big attack on Camp Gannon, there was cause for concern. “That incident was somewhat prolonged, a clear probe”. Kilo’s Commander, Capt. Ieva recalls. “It alarmed me a bit because it underlined the risk to Khe Sahn, manned at the squad level to preserve combat power. But it also gave me confidence that the Squad Leaders out there were capable of handling things.” –Chris Ieva

(I’ll need to add in the mortar fire called in by Vinny Brothman)

–Ajax

Combat Memorial

This is an article I wrote from Iraq. Seems appropriate for Veteran’s Day…

5 Jul 2007, FOB Kalsu, Iraq — As ceremonies go, it is both simple and profound. Soldiers stand in formation, shoulder to shoulder in several ranks. Arrayed before them are a pair of desert boots and a rifle with bayonet fixed, muzzle towards the earth. An empty helmet is perched on the weapon’s butt-stock, flanked by medals in their cases; a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart — posthumously awarded.

This is my first memorial service for a soldier killed in action (KIA). I earnestly hope it’s my last.

A few days ago, a young Sergeant from the unit I’m attached to here in Iraq was hit in a sudden attack. There was an earth-shaking boom, then a thick column of smoke billowing into the sky. As leaders checked in on the radio to account for their troops, I could hear the tension and barely concealed distress when it became clear there were injuries.

Then, in a wavering voice, came confirmation there’d been a KIA.

Word of who the casualty was spread quickly, and a somber mood descended. Over a dozen soldiers in this brigade have lost their lives since I’ve been here, but those losses were from other units and happened elsewhere. This was close to home. The fallen soldier was popular and widely respected. Nearby, I heard the roommate and longtime friend break down in sobs. It was a long day.

Late that night, the Sergeant began the long journey home surrounded by friends and comrades in arms. As is customary, troops from across the FOB came to line the path of the casket as it was reverently carried out to the aircraft. They call the waiting helicopter the “angel flight”, and the procession is a spontaneous, soldier-level gesture of mourning and solidarity.

The memorial service, held a few days later, is more formalized. By then family members have been notified, the press release has been issued, and the fallen soldier’s buddies, unit members and leaders are able to assemble to pay proper respects. The national anthem is played, with all standing at attention and saluting the Stars and Stripes. The chaplain gives a prayer, followed by comments from the unit commander.

One of the soldier’s closest friends comes to the podium, and this proves to be the most difficult part of the ceremony for me. The Sergeant’s character, dedication, courage and strong moral values become obvious from the friend’s heartfelt remarks. Awestruck thoughts flood my mind. Where do we get such amazing young people? How can we be worthy of them? What is the debt we owe because of their sacrifices?

The Chaplain again stands to give a scriptural meditation, with words of remembrance for the dead, comfort for the living and supplication to the Divine. The benediction is given, the honor guard fires the traditional three volleys and the sad, sweet bugle notes of “taps” fill the evening air.

Finally the unit members file by the boots-and-rifle memorial, where each stops to give a slow, deliberate salute. Then they kneel, or step forward, to gently touch a boot or put a hand on the helmet. Many also place a small token or memento by the boots. With chagrin, I realize I have nothing appropriate to offer.

Tristamoretti

But then it’s my turn. I march slowly up to the upended rifle, lean forward to touch the helmet with care while saying a silent prayer. God speed to you, Sergeant. I stand smartly at attention, raise my arm and rigid hand in a slow arc to touch the bill of my hat. And God bless you and your family, Sergeant Trista Leah Moretti.

–Ajax

See more Letters from the Sandbox

Calling All WarPigs

Right now I’m writing about the parts of Operation Matador where 3/2’s Weapons Company, callsign “WarPig”, played several key roles.  Two of the Company’s Mobile Assault Platoons, WarPig 1 and WarPig 2, established a blocking position at the “Golden Gate” bridge on Day 1 of the operation.  For the next six days, they engaged in a remarkable 360-degree firefight with a large number of insurgents.

WarPig turret

Additionally, WarPig 3 played a part in the assault on New Ubadyi on 8 May, and then crossed the river into Ramana.  I’ve captured a few of their actions (see Penny’s Shootout), but would like to understand more from their perspective.

Of course, the WarPigs were involved in virtually all 3/2’s operations and actions during the deployment.  I’m sure there is much information that can amplify my understanding.  And at some point I’ll be writing a ‘profile’ section about the Company, so can use baseline info for that.

Anyway, so far I’ve had only a few contacts with WarPig guys, and would like to develop more so I can tell their story in a fuller way.  If you were in WarPig 3/2 in 2005, send me an email, or hit me up on FaceBook.

If you’re wondering about who I am and why I’m writing this book, please take a look at these links:
Preface (suggest you start here)
About (more about my background, and my time in Iraq)
My ROE (guidelines I follow for interviews & chats)

–Ajax